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Abstract 
 
Inhibitory processes have been implicated in depressive rumination. Inhibitory 
deficits may cause difficulties in disengaging from ruminative content (e.g., Joormann, 2005), 
or rumination may constitute a working memory load, causing deficits in inhibitory control 
(e.g., Hertel, 2004). These hypotheses have different implications for the treatment of 
depression. We conducted a systematic review of existing evidence, and conclude that most 
studies do not unambiguously measure inhibition. The majority of published evidence is 
correlational, and thus supports neither causal direction. No published experimental studies 
have investigated the inhibitory deficit  rumination causal direction, and only six have 
investigated the rumination  inhibitory deficit hypothesis. In two of these studies the 
dependent variable has low construct validity. One study reported no effect of rumination on 
interference, and three did not control for mood effects. There is need for carefully designed 
experimental research that has the potential to investigate these proposed causal mechanisms. 
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Does rumination cause inhibitory deficits?  
Depressive rumination is defined as “repetitively focusing on the fact that one is 
depressed; on one’s symptoms of depression; and on the causes, meaning and consequences 
of depressive symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). There is extensive evidence that 
rumination maintains and exacerbates depressive symptoms (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 
2008), that rumination is a vulnerability factor for the onset of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991) and that, in contrast to strategies that help regulation and recovery from negative mood 
(Rusting & DeHart, 2000), rumination perpetuates low mood. Understanding the cognitive 
causes and consequences of persistent rumination is of value in improving recovery from 
dysphoric moods and reducing vulnerability to depression.   
Recent investigations have examined how the cognitive deficits and biases observed 
in depressed individuals are associated with the tendency to ruminate in response to sadness 
(e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007). In a review of cognitive 
inhibition and depression, Joormann et al. (2007) highlighted evidence that trait rumination 
was associated with poor performance on tasks thought to index cognitive control. The key 
aspect of cognitive control, in so far as it relates to rumination, was considered by Joormann 
et al. (2007) to be the ability to apply cognitive inhibition to control the contents of working 
memory. They argued that inhibitory processes constitute a central function of working 
memory and proposed that “malfunctioning inhibitory processes may have severe cognitive 
and emotional consequences, and rumination may be one of them” (p. 129). However, as 
noted by Joormann and colleagues (Joormann et al., 2007; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), the 
construct validity of a number of the paradigms in which researchers have invoked inhibition 
has been questioned (e.g., MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson & Bibi, 2003; MacLeod, 2007, 
Mayr & Bucher, 2007). More generally, a problematic issue is that researchers often invoke 
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the term “inhibition” both as explananda and explanandum – both as a description of a 
phenomenon to be explained, and as a hypothesized mental process to explain that 
phenomenon. In the current review, although we retain the terminology adopted by each 
theorist when initially reviewing their model, we later re-conceptualize all these models as 
concerning the application of control processes to reduce interference from task-irrelevant 
material in order to avoid this problem. Interference is the empirical result whereby the 
presence of task-irrelevant stimuli impairs accuracy and/or speed on task-relevant stimuli. 
When reviewing data, we consider it with respect to both the empirical observation of 
interference, and to the construct of inhibitory control; we adopt this approach in order to 
avoid making the assumption that inhibition is the most compelling explanation for a given 
observation of interference.  
Whitmer and Gotlib (2013), in their recent review of the data correlating trait 
rumination with cognitive processes that influence information processing, highlight the 
considerable expansion of work in this field in recent years and present a novel model that 
proposes trait rumination is associated with a narrowed attentional focus, which is 
characterised by reduced cognitive flexibility and enhanced maintenance of a focal goal. Both 
Joormann et al. (2007) and Whitmer and Gotlib (2013) indicate the need for a systematic 
examination of the causal nature of the established association between rumination and 
cognitive control processes. Previous reviews in this area have generated a number of key 
questions and hypotheses but have tended to focus primarily on correlational data, which 
does little to clarify the question of causality. There has yet to be a systematic review 
evaluating the experimental evidence for the hypothesised causal mechanisms relating 
depressive rumination and “inhibitory” (interference-control) deficits.  
In the current article, we critically review the extant literature on rumination and 
cognitive control processes; for the first time, this literature is reviewed to examine which of 
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the main competing causal accounts best accommodate the available data.  We begin by 
defining and operationalizing rumination, inhibition, and interference control. We consider 
the main classes of theory about the relationship between rumination and cognitive control, 
and systematically review existing evidence relevant to determining the causal relationship 
between ruminative response tendencies and the ability to apply cognitive control to reduce 
interference from task-irrelevant information. We focus specifically on studies that are of 
direct relevance to this question, with a particular emphasis on experimental studies. A 
number of theorists have emphasised the role of stimulus valence in the relationship between 
rumination and interference control. In some cases, studies have used non-emotional stimuli, 
whereas others have examined interference control deficits in processing emotional material. 
We therefore additionally review this evidence with respect to the potential role of emotional 
material in the relationship between rumination and interference control deficits. The 
characterisation of biases in the allocation of attentional resources in depression that are less 
clearly attributable to failures of cognitive control is beyond the scope of this review (see 
Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011 for a recent review of this literature).  
Conceptualizing and Measuring Rumination 
Response Styles Theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) conceptualises depressive 
rumination as a stable, trait-like style of responding to depressed mood involving persistent 
focus on one’s negative emotional state. Rumination is typically assessed on the Ruminative 
Responses Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991), which is the measure adopted by the majority of research examining rumination and 
interference control. The RRS is a 22-item scale that asks participants to report the frequency 
with which they ruminate in response to sad or depressed moods (e.g., participants are asked 
to rate how frequently  they “analyse recent events to try and understand why you are 
depressed”, when feeling down, sad, or depressed). Treynor, Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema 
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(2003) identified two distinct components within the RRS – brooding and reflection. 
Brooding is conceptualised as negative and evaluative focus on the self, and is proposed to be 
maladaptive; reflection is conceptualised as a purposeful focus on problem solving aimed at 
alleviating symptoms of depression and is argued to be adaptive. According to RST (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) ruminative responses are habitual and automatic, typically developing 
during childhood.  
Although the majority of research examining the relationship between rumination and 
interference control has adopted Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) formulation of rumination, a 
number of other important models of rumination have also been proposed. Goal-oriented 
theories of rumination (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987; Watkins, 2008, 2010) propose that detection of a discrepancy between 
one’s current status and anticipated progress towards a goal instigates ruminative thoughts, 
which continue until either the discrepancy is resolved (by resuming one’s anticipated rate of 
goal progress) or the individual disengages from the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996).  
Conceptualizing and Measuring Inhibition and Interference  
MacLeod (2007) proposed that the construct of inhibition is best conceptualized as 
“the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or without 
intention” (p.5). In a number of tasks that are regarded as classic demonstrations of inhibitory 
processes, alternative accounts are also possible (e.g., Neill & Mathis, 1998; MacLeod et al., 
2003; MacLeod, 2007). For example, negative priming is a form of interference revealed by 
the slowing of response to a stimulus that has recently been ignored. It has been argued by 
some that negative priming reflects the time taken to overcome inhibition of previously 
ignored material that has subsequently become relevant (e.g., Houghton & Tipper, 1984). 
However, there are alternative accounts of negative priming that do not implicate inhibition, 
and it is a matter of debate whether negative priming is best described as an inhibitory 
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phenomenon (see e.g. May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Tipper, 2001, Mayr & Buchner, 2007). In 
our review of the empirical data regarding rumination and cognitive control, we use the more 
theoretically neutral terminology of interference in cases where there is not reasonable 
consensus that inhibitory processes underlie the observed result of interference. For example, 
the magnitude of negative priming in an individual is less controversially described as the 
extent to which interference from no longer relevant material impairs efficient task 
performance, than as an index of their ability to inhibit previously relevant information 
(although even the former description is debatable; a point to which we return to later). 
A number of researchers have argued that inhibitory control is not a unitary ability but 
that instead it fractionates into multiple components (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Hasher 
& Zacks, 1988; Nigg, 2000), these components being:  (a) resistance to distraction (including 
the blocking of irrelevant information from access to working memory, WM); (b) resistance 
to proactive interference (i.e., the ability to resist interference from information that was 
previously relevant to the task but has since become irrelevant); and (c) inhibiting prepotent 
responses. A number of researchers (e.g., Aron, 2007; Bissett, Nee, & Jonides, 2009) have 
argued that whilst there is evidence to suggest that inhibitory control is implicated in 
withholding prepotent behavioural responses, it is not clear that inhibition plays a role in 
other types of interference, such as resistance to proactive interference.   
Theoretical accounts relating rumination and interference  
There are four possible accounts of the relationship between rumination and deficits 
in the ability to apply cognitive control to resolve interference. First, impaired interference (I) 
control causes increased rumination (R) (IR). Second, on-going rumination causes 
impaired interference control (RI). Third, there is a bi-directional relationship between 
rumination and interference control (R↔ I). Fourth, the association between rumination and 
interference control deficits is secondary to a third factor, such as depression, which causes 
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both increased rumination and impaired interference control. These contrasting accounts of 
rumination and interference control processes have distinct implications for clinical 
understanding of, and interventions for, depression. In the sections that follow, we categorize 
extant theories as belonging to one of these four classes of account.  
The theoretical models that have been proposed in support of these causal hypotheses 
have operationalized the ability to resolve interference in different ways. Linville (1996) and 
Joormann (2006) both invoke the construct of inhibition. Joormann specifically considers the 
application of inhibitory processes to distinct aspects of the ability to control the contents of 
working memory (e.g., Joormann et al., 2007). Other authors have adopted the terminology 
of cognitive control and have favoured a more procedural approach to conceptualising the 
relationship between rumination and complex cognition (e.g., Hertel, 2004). The models 
converge in proposing that there is a causal relationship between rumination and constructs 
implicating the application of higher level cognitive control to resist interference from task-
irrelevant content.  
It is of note that a number of the theorists primarily emphasise one causal direction 
but also acknowledge the possibility of a bi-directional account (e.g., Joormann, 2005 is 
primarily concerned with the IR hypothesis but additionally recognises a bi-directional 
hypothesis). There is therefore some overlap between the different theoretical accounts of 
rumination and interference control, and much of the theoretical work in this field cannot be 
neatly classified as solely considering on one of the four causal hypotheses. Where a theorist 
has proposed one causal hypothesis but additionally noted other possible accounts, we weight 
our review of their model to reflect that emphasis. 
Interference-control deficits as a cause of rumination (IR) 
The most elaborated accounts of inhibitory deficits as a cause of rumination have 
been developed by Linville (1996) and Joormann (2005). Koster and colleagues have recently 
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introduced a related account (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Linville 
(1996) proposed two possibilities: (1) that ruminative thoughts access consciousness because 
they are goal-related (i.e., in the absence of inhibitory deficits), and (2) that stress and 
depression might deplete inhibitory capabilities, resulting in rumination (see also Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979). It is the second possibility we consider here. 
Linville proposed a number of mechanisms by which weakened inhibitory attentional 
processes might cause intrusive ruminative thoughts to occur. Firstly, difficulties in 
preventing ruminative thoughts accessing working memory as a consequence of poor 
inhibitory control might result in concurrent and inefficient processing of both one’s current 
task and the focus of ruminative thinking. Second, inefficient inhibitory control might result 
in proactive interference of thoughts pertaining to a concern that has subsequently become 
irrelevant due to a change in goals. Third, depleted inhibitory control could allow proactive 
interference from rejected interpretations and unsuccessful attempts at goal-pursuit.  
Joormann’s (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann, 2005; Joormann et al., 2007; 
Joormann, 2010; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010) model of cognitive control mechanisms in 
depression proposes that deficits in the ability to control the contents of working memory, 
and specifically in the application of inhibitory processes in service of this, causes depressed 
individuals to experience difficulties blocking or removing irrelevant negative content from 
working memory. This, in turn, fosters rumination. Joormann (2005) proposes that all three 
of the inhibitory process subtypes (Friedman & Miyake, 2004) are implicated in rumination. 
First, Joormann proposes that depressed individuals have a specific deficit in preventing 
irrelevant negative material from accessing working memory (i.e., resistance to distraction), 
which once activated is not easily discarded from working memory (i.e., resistance to 
proactive interference), resulting in rumination and persistent negative mood. Second, 
Joormann proposes that poor inhibition causes depressed individuals to experience 
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difficulties overcoming a depression-related prepotent tendency to ruminate and argues that 
inhibition of such responses (prepotent response inhibition) is required in order to redirect 
attention to the current task.  
Koster and colleagues (Koster et al., 2011) propose a reciprocal relationship between 
depression, attentional control, and rumination, whereby depression is characterised by 
impaired attentional control in the presence of negative information. Koster et al. define 
attentional control as “the ability to selectively attend to task-relevant information and to 
inhibit distraction by task-irrelevant material” (p. 139), and argue that this implicates 
inhibition, set-shifting, and the monitoring and updating of working memory contents. 
Impaired attentional disengagement from negative material is in turn proposed to contribute 
to the vulnerability to persistent and repetitive rumination. Finally, persistent rumination is 
hypothesised to exacerbate negative mood, thereby further narrowing attentional focus and 
exacerbating biases in the allocation of attentional resources such that mood congruent 
emotional material is preferentially processed and depletes available attentional resources.  
Interference-control deficits as a consequence of rumination (RI) 
A number of theoretical accounts (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Beevers, 2005; Ellis 
& Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel, 1997, 2004; von Hecker & Sedak, 1999) share the hypothesis that 
ruminative thoughts occupy attentional resources, thereby reducing available working 
memory capacity or executive control capabilities and impairing performance on concurrent 
tasks that require effortful processing. Thus, an alternative model of the relationship between 
rumination and interference-control processes is that on-going rumination results in greater 
cognitive interference and thus causally impairs concurrent task performance. The different 
theoretical accounts that share this hypothesis make a series of related but distinct predictions 
regarding the relationship between state rumination and cognitive control. 
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The cognitive exhaustion model of depression (Kofta & Sedak, 1998; von Hecker & 
Sedak, 1999) proposes “uncontrollability, and in particular ruminating thoughts about 
uncontrollable conditions, lead to a depletion of those cognitive resources that support 
generative and flexible, constructive thinking” (von Hecker & Sedak, 1999, p. 835). The 
model thus predicts that rumination-related impairments will be evident on tasks that require 
flexible shifting between different task goals.  
Beevers’s (2005) dual process model of cognitive vulnerability to depression, and 
resource allocation models of depression (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hartlage et al., 1993), 
propose that cognitive capacity is occupied by mood-congruent and ruminative thinking in 
depression, and as a consequence, cognitive capacity available for processing information 
relevant to concurrent effortful tasks is reduced. Beevers’s (2005) dual process model, and 
the resource allocation models (Hartlage et al., 1993), share the prediction that ruminative 
thoughts result in impairments that are specific to cognitive tasks that are attentionally 
demanding, and the degree of impairment is predicted to be determined by the effortfulness 
of the task.  
Interference-control deficits as both cause and consequence of rumination 
A number of theorists (e.g., De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Hartlage et al., 1993; Hertel, 
2004; Joormann et al., 2007) note the possibility that impaired interference control is both a 
cause and a consequence of rumination. Depleted interference-control resources may 
interfere with the capacity to override ruminative response tendencies. Once initiated, 
rumination may result in a cognitive load, further depleting inhibitory resources available for 
other tasks.  
Hertel (2004) proposes that depressed individuals have habits of ruminating and 
argues that “Deficient cognitive control sets the stage for habits to emerge. At the same time, 
thoughts that habitually occupy attention leave little mental room for thoughts about anything 
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else” (p. 195). Hertel’s (2004) model thus conceptualises the relationship between rumination 
and cognitive control as reciprocal. Such a proposal implies that the relationship between 
rumination and interference resolution may be bi-directional and have a synergistic effect on 
cognitive capacity.  
Hertel (Hertel & Rude, 1991; Hertel, 1997, 2004) further proposes that constrained 
situations (for example, memory tasks that require participants to verbally rehearse the test 
material during the learning phase) eliminate the opportunity to ruminate, and that deficient 
attentional control, habits of attending to ruminative thoughts, and difficulties initiating task-
focused cognitive strategies are responsible for depressed individuals’ impaired performance 
on unconstrained tasks. Hertel (1997) posits that depressive impairments are greatest on 
unconstrained tasks that permit task-irrelevant ruminative thought, thus task performance is 
predicted to be improved under more structured (e.g., Hertel & Rude, 1991) or attentionally 
demanding (e.g., Krames & MacDonald, 1985) conditions.  
Whitmer and Gotlib (2013) hypothesise that trait ruminators are characterised by a 
narrowed attentional scope, whereby cognitive processing is limited to a restricted set of 
information. Narrowing attentional scope is proposed to increase the likelihood of 
rumination, and lowered mood is proposed to result in a narrowing of attentional scope. The 
model thus argues that attentional scope is a mechanism underpinning the association 
between depressed mood and increased rumination. A narrowed attentional scope is 
hypothesised to have different consequences for cognitive control, depending on whether 
optimal task performance requires cognitive flexibility, or the ability to maintain a single task 
goal in the absence of external reinforcement. Specifically, Whitmer and Gotlib argue that 
narrowed attentional scope causes both benefits (reduced susceptibility to distraction) and 
deficits (increased cognitive inflexibility) to aspects of interference control. Whitmer and 
Gotlib further propose that for high trait ruminators both reduced cognitive flexibility and 
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greater resistance to distraction play a causal role in increased rumination. This hypothesis is 
broadly consistent with I→R models of rumination. Whitmer and Gotlib conceptualise their 
narrowed attentional scope hypothesis as complementary to resource depletion models, which 
they characterise in terms of an R→I causal account. Their model is thus consistent with a bi-
directional account whereby the cognitive concomitants of a narrowed attentional scope 
cause increased rumination, which in turn reduces available cognitive resources.  
 
Interference-control deficits and rumination as consequences of depression  
 A number of theorists note that depressive symptoms such as negative affect or loss of 
motivation, may cause both rumination and interference-control deficits (e.g., Frings, 
Wentura, & Holtz, 2007; Hartlage et al., 1993; Jones et al., 2010; Joormann, 2010; Whitmer 
& Gotlib, 2013). Thus, it is possible that rumination and interference-control deficits are not 
causally related, and that both are a consequence of depression. 
Literature Search 
A computerised search using keyword terms was conducted to identify relevant 
publications. The search (using wild cards such as ruminat* for rumination, ruminative, 
ruminate, ruminator) included the following keyword terms intended to identify studies 
examining rumination: rumination, depression, dysphoria, self-focus, repetitive thought, 
perseverative, worry, which were combined with each of the following keyword terms to 
identify studies examining interference control: inhibition, inhibitory, interference, prepotent, 
cognition, cognitive, executive, attention, working memory, memory, entered into ISI Web of 
Knowledge and PsycINFO from the beginning of the database through to August 2013. In 
addition, the reference lists of the identified publications, as well as key review articles and 
chapters (e.g., Joormann, 2005; Hertel, 2004; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) were reviewed for 
relevant literature. Only English language papers that examined rumination and interference 
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control processes in adult samples were included. Studies that did not include a behavioural 
measure of interference were not included (for example, studies reporting a correlation 
between trait rumination and self-report measures of off-task thinking, or studies reporting 
the patterns of deployment of neural resources associated with rumination). Finally, studies 
for which it was not possible to obtain the necessary information either from published 
sources or the relevant authors (i.e., no manuscript was available) were not included. A table 
summarising the studies identified and reporting their design, the cognitive task used, the 
valence of the task stimuli, and the main findings is presented in the Appendix.  
To our knowledge, this is the first review reporting a systematic literature search to 
examine this field in depth with respect to the proposed causal relationship(s) between 
rumination and interference. Whitmer and Gotlib’s (2013) systematic review considers an 
overlapping body of work, but their focus is different in four ways. First, they consider 
correlational evidence in depth, while the current review covers this only briefly, focussing 
instead on experimental work, which – unlike correlational studies – can inform the issue of 
causal direction central to this review. Second, Whitmer and Gotlib’s review omits twelve 
relevant studies considered in the current review (Cheun et al., 2012; Curci Lanciano, Soleti, 
& Rime, 2013; De Lissnyder, Koster, Everaert, Schacht, Van den Abeele, & De Raedt, 2012; 
Joorman & Gotlib, 2010; Lee Pe, Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013; Lee Pe et al., 2013; 
Levens et al. 2009; Owens & Derakshan, 2013; Stoute & Rokke, 2010; Vanderhasselt et al., 
2011; von Hippel et al., 2008; Wong & Moulds, 2008). Third, Whitmer and Gotlib (2013) 
generally take the construct validity of interference-control measures at face value, while the 
current review critically examines that construct validity, employing what is known from the 
often-extensive non-clinical literature on these measures. Fourth, Whitmer and Gotlib’s 
review is primarily a vehicle for the introduction of a new model (the attention scope model). 
The attentional scope theory has potential to guide and inform future research, but the focus 
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in the current article is on the evaluation of more established – and hence more widely tested 
- accounts.  
 In our systematic review, we identified three main types of studies: (a) correlational 
studies relating individual differences in trait rumination to interference, (b) prospective 
studies that related individual differences in trait rumination to interference longitudinally, 
and (c) experimental studies that manipulated state rumination and measured subsequent 
interference control. In the sections that follow, we briefly summarize the correlational and 
prospective studies and consider the predominant patterns of findings emerging from such 
data. However, such data cannot discriminate between the four potential accounts of the 
relationship between interference and rumination discussed above. Thus, we only consider in 
detail those studies which have the potential to discriminate between the four accounts. 
Establishing the construct validity of the paradigms that have been adopted by these 
experimental studies is critical to developing a clear synthesis of the evidence relating 
rumination and interference. The experimental studies are thus organized by experimental 
paradigm, and each paradigm is reviewed and critically evaluated in terms of whether, on 
conservative criteria, it can be considered to index inhibitory control or interference.  
Evidence of an association between rumination and interference control processes 
Over 20 studies report a correlation between trait rumination and interference 
(Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Berman et al., 2011; Bernblum & Mor, 2010; 
Daches, Mor, Winquist, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2010; Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; De 
Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; De Lissnyder, Koster, Everaert et al., 2012; Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003; Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; 
Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011; Joormann, Nee, Berman, Jonides, & Gotlib, 2010; 
Joormann & Tran, 2009; Lau, Christensen, Hawley, Gemar, & Segal, 2007; Lee Pe, Raes et 
al., 2013; Lee Pe, Vandekerckhove et al., 2013; Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009; Meiran, 
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Diamond, Toder, & Nemets, 2011; Owens & Derakshan, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2002; Stout 
& Rokke, 2010; Vanderhasselt, Kuhn, & De Raedt, 2011; von Hippel, Vasey, Gonda, & 
Stern, 2008; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Banich, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2012; 
Zetsche, D’Avanzato & Joormann, 2012). Four studies found no evidence of an association 
between trait rumination and behavioural measures of interference (Cheun Yee Lo, Lau, 
Cheung, & Allen, 2012; Goeleven et al., 2006; Krompinger & Simons, 2011; Ray et al., 
2005). Three prospective studies report a longitudinal relationship between trait rumination 
and interference (Demeyer, De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; De Lissnyder, Koster, 
Goubert, Onreadt, Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2012; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). There is 
thus convergent evidence from a number of measures of interference control that individual 
differences in trait rumination are related to the capacity to resist interference from material 
that is not currently relevant.  
A substantial number of the paradigms employed are ambiguous with respect to the 
specific processes that they are indexing. For example, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) 
assessed cognitive control using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 
1948) which is understood to implicate attention, set-shifting, inhibition, and working 
memory (e.g., Greve, Williams, Haas, Littell, & Reioso, 1996; Miyake, Friedman et al., 
2000). Thus, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema’s study supports the proposal that rumination is 
associated with impaired performance on cognitive tasks, but it is not possible to infer 
whether this relationship is specific to interference on the basis of their data. However, 
several studies report an association between trait rumination and interference using 
paradigms with better construct validity (for example, a number of studies report an 
association between trait rumination and interference on Oberauer’s (2001) modified 
Sternberg task, which is regarded as a relatively valid index of interference; Joormann & 
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Gotlib, 2008; Joormann, Levens & Gotlib, 2011;  Joormann, Nee, Berman, Jonides, & Gotlib, 
2010).  
Interestingly, several of the other correlational studies in this area report evidence 
consistent with the idea that trait rumination is associated with more efficient performance on 
tasks implicating inhibitory control or interference, although the authors of those studies 
seldom interpret their results in this manner. For example, a number of studies have 
demonstrated an association between trait rumination and reduced backward inhibition, 
which is interpreted by the authors of those studies as demonstrating impaired inhibitory 
control in high trait ruminators (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; 
Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). Backward inhibition is an empirical phenomenon related to task 
switching, and is indexed as the additional time taken to switch to a recently employed task 
set (e.g., switching back to task A in task sequence A-B-A) relative to the time taken to 
switch to a less recently employed task set (e.g., switching to the task C task sequence A-B-
C). Thus, the reduced backward inhibition observed in high trait ruminators, relative to 
controls, indicates greater efficiency in returning to recently performed task sets, and thus 
suggests more efficient cognitive control in high trait ruminators than in controls. De 
Lissnyder et al. (2010) report that trait brooders exhibited reduced backward inhibition 
specifically for angry faces using an affective shift task, suggesting that their observation of 
enhanced efficiency may be attributable to facilitated processing of negative material. 
However, Whitmer and Banich (2007) and Whitmer and Gotlib (2012) employed neutral 
stimuli, indicating that emotional valence is not sufficient to account for the association 
between trait rumination and reduced backward inhibition in at least two of these three 
studies. Similar patterns of findings are reported in studies examining negative affective 
priming (e.g., Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), performance on the modified 
Stroop task (Altamirano et al., 2010), retrieval induced forgetting (Whitmer & Banich, 2010), 
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and suppression-induced forgetting (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). Of these studies, six involved 
emotional material (Hertel and Gerstle (2003) and Joormann (2006) report enhanced 
performance for positive and negative stimuli; Joormann and Tran (2009) report enhanced 
performance for positive stimuli; Zetsche and Joormann (2011) and Joormann and Gotlib 
(2010) report enhanced performance for negative stimuli; Pe, Vandekerckhove et al. (2013) 
report enhanced performance for positive, negative and neutral stimuli) and a further two 
involved neutral stimuli (Altamirano et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2010). Thus, the role of 
emotional stimulus valence may contribute to some but not all observations of rumination-
related performance benefits. Whilst Altamirano et al. (2010) would recognise this 
characterisation of their findings, in all other cases our interpretation is at odds with the 
interpretation of the authors. We discuss this contentious issue in further depth towards the 
end of this review.  
In summary, fifteen studies are consistent with high trait rumination being associated 
with deficits in interference control (Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Berman et al., 2011; Daches et 
al., 2010; Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Demeyer et al., 2012; De Lissnyder Koster, & De 
Raedt, 2012; De Lissnyder, Koster, Everaert et al., 2012; De Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert et 
al., 2012; Lau et al., 2007; Levens et al., 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann et al., 
2011; Owens & Derakshan, 2013; Stout & Rokke, 2010; Zetsche et al., 2012), four are 
indicative of trait rumination being associated with both benefits and deficits to interference 
control processes (Altamirano et al., 2010; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), and seven are consistent with trait rumination being 
associated with the utilization of a level of interference control that is more appropriate to the 
demands of the task and thus results in benefit to performance (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Lee 
Pe, Vandekerckhove et al., 2013; Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Joormann & 
Tran, 2009; Whitmer & Banich, 2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). 
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However, this sort of data does little to further understanding about the causal nature 
of the relationship between rumination and interference control. Sleeping with the light on 
during infancy is correlated with myopia in later life (Quinn et al., 1999) but the relationship 
is unlikely to be causal (e.g., Gwiazda et al., 2000). In the case of rumination and interference 
control, the association may be mediated by confounding variables such as depression or low 
mood. Hence, the remainder of this review focuses on experimental evidence that in principle 
has the potential to provide evidence for or against the two leading causal accounts. 
Specifically, we consider experimental evidence in which the hypothesised cause has been 
manipulated and changes in the effect of interest have been examined. The proposed causal 
impact of poor interference control on rumination would be examined by manipulating the 
effectiveness of interference control processes and measuring the effect that this has on the 
susceptibility to rumination. The proposed causal impact of rumination on interference 
control would be examined by manipulating rumination and measuring the effect that this has 
on interference control capabilities. 
Impaired Interference Control as a Cause of Rumination: The Evidence  
Despite many commentators implicitly or explicitly postulating impaired interference 
control as a cause of rumination (e.g., Hertel, 2004; Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 
2008; Levens et al., 2009; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; 2010), there are no published 
experimental studies that have examined this possibility. There are some prospective studies 
(e.g., Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), but prospective studies cannot establish causality (as the 
example of childhood myopia, cited earlier, illustrates). There are also no experimental 
studies examining Whitmer and Gotlib’s (2013) recent proposal that a narrowed attentional 
scope (defined as impaired cognitive flexibility and reduced susceptibility to distraction) 
causes rumination. Future work to provide a more detailed specification of how attentional 
20 
 
scope might be operationalized and measured will be an important step in examining the 
hypotheses generated by this account of trait rumination and cognitive control. 
Rumination as a Cause of Impaired Interference Control: The Evidence 
 There are six experimental studies (Curci et al., 2013; Hertel, 1998; Philippot & 
Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012; Wong & Moulds, 2008) 
that have examined the effects of experimentally manipulating rumination on subsequent 
performance on cognitive tasks. Although experimentation is a necessary condition for 
establishing causality, it is not a sufficient one; at a minimum, the independent and dependent 
variables must have acceptable construct validity, and there must be adequate control for 
confounding variables. In the sections that follow, we critique the construct validity of the 
experimental procedures in the extant experimental literature. 
Random Number Generation 
Watkins and Brown (2002) compared the performance of depressed and non-
depressed individuals on a random number generation task following rumination and 
distraction inductions. In the random number generation task, participants are instructed to 
say the numbers 1 to 9 in a random order 100 times at a rate of one per second, which is 
paced using a metronome. An alternative version of the task involves pressing keys 
corresponding to each number in a random order. Watkins and Brown (2002) found that 
depressed patients were impaired on generation of random numbers relative to non-depressed 
patients in the rumination condition but not in the distraction condition, in which the groups 
did not differ. Thus, their results are consistent with the proposal that depression-related 
impairments in cognitive control are maintained by ongoing rumination, and are ameliorated 
by distraction, which temporarily eliminates rumination. 
Random number generation is generally considered to involve working memory and 
is frequently interpreted as an index of cognitive control processes (e.g., Baddeley, Emslie, 
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Kolodny & Duncan, 1998; Brown, Soliveri, & Jahanshahi, 1998), including the ability to 
inhibit prepotent counting responses, the ability to generate possible responses, the ability to 
maintain the complete set of response options in mind continually, and to recall those that 
have recently been used (Towse & Valentine, 1997). Thus, Watkins and Brown’s (2002) 
finding suggests that state rumination impairs cognitive control processes, but does not 
establish that this effect is specific to interference control.  
Operation word memory span test (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989) 
Curci et al. (2013) examined the impact of negative and neutral mood inductions on 
self-reported rumination and available working memory resources in individuals high and 
low in working memory capacity. Current working memory capacity (as assessed by the 
OSPAN), and positive and negative emotions (assessed by the Differential Emotion Scale; 
DES; Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974)  were assessed before and after 
participants were randomised to read written passages of either negative or neutral emotional 
valence. Self-reported rumination and intrusive thoughts were assessed immediately after the 
second OSPAN test, and 24 hours later. Following the mood induction, self-reported 
rumination mediated the association between negative emotional state and working memory 
performance on the OSPAN; negative emotion on the DES was found to cause increased 
rumination, which in turn reduced working memory capacity. A number of cognitive control 
processes including strategy selection, monitoring, resource allocation, and other non-
executive processes have been implicated in OSPAN performance (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 
2005). Thus, Curci et al.’s data is consistent with the hypothesis that ruminative thoughts 
about negative emotional states occupy working memory capacity, but does not establish that 
this specifically impacts on interference control. 
Directed forgetting 
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Wong and Moulds (2008) used a directed forgetting paradigm to examine cognitive 
control amongst dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals following either rumination or 
distraction. Directed forgetting tasks (Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Nee & Jonides, 2008) require participants to forget a subset of previously studied material. 
Subsequent recall of both the material that they were instructed to remember, and that which 
they were told to forget is measured: proactive interference from the to-be-forgotten material 
is indexed by increased recall of this material and decreased recall of the material to be 
remembered. MacLeod (1998) reviewed the evidence regarding theoretical accounts of 
directed forgetting, and concluded that when participants are instructed which material is to 
be forgotten using a list procedure (as opposed to being cued whether to remember or forget 
each item before the next item is presented), the paradigm can be regarded as a relatively 
clear measure of resistance to proactive interference.  
Wong and Moulds reported that dysphoric participants in the rumination and 
distraction conditions did not differ in directed forgetting for positive, negative, or neutral 
words; all dysphoric participants exhibited standard directed forgetting effects. However, 
Wong and Moulds found that their rumination and distraction inductions differentially 
influenced change in self-reported self-focus (using the standard VAS scales that have been 
used in studies with these manipulations – e.g., Watkins, 2004), but not in happiness or 
sadness. The majority of studies that have used the rumination and distraction inductions 
have found a reliable differential effect on changes in self-reported mood (e.g., Lavender & 
Watkins, 2004; Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & 
Zehm, 2003; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), which is used as a manipulation check for the successful 
induction of rumination versus distraction. Thus, it is not clear that the rumination 
manipulations operated in the usual way in this study. One could infer from this that it is not 
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clear that rumination had been reliably induced since rumination is understood to exacerbate 
dysphoric mood states. Alternatively, one could argue that this study represents a potentially 
valuable case where self-focus changes independent of mood, and interestingly the study 
finds no evidence to indicate that rumination in the absence of mood change impairs 
interference control. 
 Controlled retrieval (process dissociation procedure) 
Hertel (1998) compared the performance of dysphoric and non-dysphoric students on 
the fragment completion test of memory for studied word pairs, using Jacoby’s (1991, 1996, 
1998) procedure to dissociate controlled and automatic retrieval. Jacoby’s (1996) stem-
completion task presents participants with a series of neutral word pairs, which they are 
instructed to remember for a later memory test (learning phase). In the test phase, participants 
are given word stems to complete. In trials where the instruction “use old” is presented, 
participants must use the stem as a cue to recall a word from the learning phase and complete 
the stem with this word. For trials in which the instruction “use new” is presented, 
participants must also use the stem to cue recall of a word from the learning phase, but must 
not use the recalled words to complete the stem and instead produce a novel completion. 
Jacoby (1991, 1998) developed a process dissociation procedure whereby the relative 
contributions of controlled and automatic processes to the task are estimated. Completions 
using an old word can be achieved via both controlled retrieval, with a probability of R, and 
automatic processes (i.e., the word came to mind automatically), with a probability of A. 
When participants are asked to retrieve a new word, production of an old word reflects the 
success of automatic processes and failure of controlled processes (Jacoby, 1991, 1998). The 
estimate of controlled retrieval is thus the proportion of targets correctly used on “use old” 
trials minus the proportion used erroneously on “use new” trials.  
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Between the encoding phase and the stem-completion phase, Hertel (1998) 
manipulated rumination by allocating participants to one of three conditions: a rumination 
induction, an unconstrained interval (in which it was hypothesised that dysphoric individuals 
would be likely to engage in rumination), and a distraction induction. Dysphoria-related 
impairments in controlled retrieval, relative to the non-dysphoric group, were observed 
following a rumination induction, or a period of unconstrained thought, but not following a 
distraction induction. Thus, consistent with the hypothesis that rumination causes 
interference-control deficits, eliminating the opportunity to ruminate eliminated cognitive 
control impairments. Hertel’s measure of interference control appears to have adequate 
construct validity. However, there was no manipulation check of the rumination induction, 
which limits the extent to which the findings can be reliably attributed to rumination.  
Stroop interference 
Philippot and Brutoux (2008) used a modified Stroop task to examine interference 
control processes for neutral stimuli in dysphoric and non-dysphoric female undergraduates 
following a rumination or distraction induction. The study included conditions designed to 
examine Stroop interference (participants were asked to name the ink colour of printed 
congruent and incongruent colour words) and flexibility (participants were presented with 
colour words printed in different ink colours, some of which were framed; they were asked to 
read the framed words and to say the ink colour of the unframed words). Dysphoric 
participants in the rumination condition made significantly more interference errors than any 
other participant group, and dysphoric participants across both conditions made more 
flexibility errors than the control group.  
The Stroop paradigm is one of the most frequently used cognitive tests and is 
designed to index interference control (MacLeod, 2005). One way of conceiving Stroop 
interference is as a measure of prepotent response inhibition, with the prepotent response 
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being naming the word (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004; May & Hasher, 1998). Another 
possibility is that Stroop interference is a consequence of competition from the task level 
(i.e., the reading task set), rather purely the response level (Monsell, Taylor & Murphy, 
2001); an account that does not necessarily implicate inhibition. In the light of multiple 
plausible accounts of Stroop interference, it seems safest to conclude that Stroop interference 
provides an index of interference, but not necessarily of inhibition. Philippot and Brutoux’s 
(2008) study thus demonstrates a causal influence of rumination on the efficiency of 
interference resolution. 
 Task switching and backward inhibition 
Whitmer and Gotlib (2012) examined the effect of a rumination induction on the 
backward inhibition procedure (described in an earlier section), and reported that depressed 
ruminators exhibited significantly greater switch costs than both depressed individuals in the 
distraction condition and non-depressed ruminators. In contrast to the correlational data we 
discussed earlier (Whitmer & Banich, 2007, Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), there were no effects 
of depression or rumination on backward inhibition in this experimental manipulation. It is of 
note that the manipulation checks following the rumination and distraction inductions 
examined mood, but not self-focus. The absence of a self-focus manipulation check casts 
some doubt as to whether rumination was effectively induced in this study.  
Convergent evidence from working memory load 
The hypothesis that rumination causes impaired interference control typically assumes 
mediation of this relationship through rumination occupying working memory capacity, and 
thus impairing performance on tasks that are sensitive to working memory load (Hester & 
Garavan, 2005). Consistent with this account, Curci et al (2013) report state rumination 
mediated the association between negative mood and working memory capacity, and many of 
the tasks used to assess interference resolution in the studies reviewed above are known to be 
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sensitive to the imposition of concurrent working memory load, or to systematically vary 
according to working memory span. For example, the Stroop task is sensitive to individual 
differences in working memory span such that individuals low in working memory capacity 
make more errors and exhibit larger response latency interference effects (Kane & Engle, 
2003). Working memory load reduces R (controlled retrieval) whilst leaving A (automatic 
generation of the word without recollection) relatively unimpaired on inclusion-exclusion 
memory tasks such as that used by Hertel (1998) (Jacoby, 1998). Working memory load also 
impairs random number generation (Towse & Valentine, 1997), and task switching (see 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010 for recent discussion). Indeed, there is no 
firm evidence to discount working memory span being critical to any of the interference 
control paradigms that have been related to rumination.  
Summary 
There is preliminary evidence that is consistent with the proposal that state rumination 
interferes with concurrent cognitive control resulting in decrements to task performance. 
Three studies provide evidence that induced rumination impairs performance on tasks that 
can be regarded as relatively clear measures of interference (Hertel, 1998; Philippot & 
Brutoux, 2008; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012); one study reports a null finding (Wong & Moulds, 
2008). In all three positive cases, describing the studies as measuring inhibitory control is 
going beyond the data. If researchers wish to investigate inhibitory control specifically, future 
experimental work may wish to consider using tasks which basic research supports as indices 
of inhibition. Examples include the stop-signal task and the response signal procedure 
(Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984; Ratcliff, 2006).  
Confounding variables 
Mood state 
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Rumination and distraction inductions differ in emotionality (Philippot & Brutoux, 
2008). Distraction temporarily improves low mood in depressed individuals (Lyubomirsky, 
Kasri, & Zehm, 2003, Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), whilst rumination exacerbates negative 
mood (Lyubomirsky et al., 2003, Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), but has little emotional impact on 
people in a neutral mood. Negative mood is itself associated with poor performance on 
executive tasks (e.g., Channon, 1996; Snyder, 2013), reduced attentional flexibility 
(Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & Walker, 2002), mood-congruent biases in attention 
and memory (Koster, De Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010), and more frequent 
attentional lapses when completing tasks requiring sustained attention (Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). Moreover, negative mood is hypothesised to narrow 
attentional focus at the expense of flexible and creative thinking (e.g., Clore & Gasper, 2000; 
Koster et al., 2011). It is thus possible that it is the change in mood induced by rumination or 
the improvement in mood induced by distraction that mediates the differential effects of 
rumination and distraction on interference, rather than these effects being a direct 
consequence of rumination per se. 
Of the three studies that provide evidence for the hypothesis that rumination causes 
impaired interference control, Philippot and Brutoux (2008) and Hertel (1998) did not assess 
the affective consequences of their rumination and distraction manipulations, and so 
mediation via mood state cannot be ruled out. Whitmer and Gotlib (2012) found that the 
rumination induction worsened mood more for depressed than non-depressed individuals, as 
would be predicted by a mood-based account. Future work including a non-ruminative mood 
induction as a control condition is needed in order differentiate the consequences of 
rumination for cognitive control from the consequences of exacerbating or alleviating 
depressed mood. Watkins and colleagues have examined the effects of two variants of the 
standard rumination induction which are equivalent in emotional valence and effect of 
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negative mood (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale; 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Only one of 
these is consistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination by focusing on abstract 
thinking about “why”. The effect of rumination on interference control can be distinguished 
from the effect of low mood and could therefore potentially be examined through the use of 
such inductions.  
Motivation 
Once activated, ruminative thoughts might be prioritised at the expense of optimal 
task performance because such thoughts pertain to personally important concerns. Thus, as 
noted by Linville (1996), a full account of the relationship between rumination and 
interference needs to address both cognitive and motivational components of rumination.  
Future challenges 
Testing the I →R hypothesis 
No studies have yet examined the hypothesis that manipulating inhibitory control 
influences subsequent rumination. An important methodological issue for this line of 
investigation is what constitutes a valid index of state rumination. Previous work has tended 
to focus on the consequences of state rumination, inferring rumination from self-report 
measures of state mood and self-focus (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). A direct measure of 
state rumination is essential in order to experimentally test hypotheses regarding putative 
causes of rumination, including the predictions derived from I→R models. Recent research 
examining the causal impact of goal discrepancies on state levels of rumination indicates that 
thought probe methodologies offer a promising approach to directly assess state rumination 
about idiographic personal concerns (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013).  
Future work manipulating inhibitory control and indexing levels of state rumination 
with such direct measures before and after manipulations will be an important avenue for 
directly testing the hypothesis that impaired inhibitory control causes rumination. A particular 
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challenge with respect to this question is that a robust and valid manipulation of inhibitory 
control has not yet been established, although there are a number of possibilities that merit 
investigation. First, a manipulation that temporarily depletes interference control resources 
(e.g., with alcohol consumption, Easdon & Vogel-Sprott, 2000) could be employed. Alcohol 
consumption has been demonstrated to influence the cognitive control resources that are 
deployed in inhibitory processing (e.g., Easdon & Vogel-Sprott, 2000; Fillmore, Vogel-
Sprott, & Gavrilescu, 1999; Finnigan, Schulze, & Smallwood, 2007). Second, methods 
designed to improve interference control (e.g., a working memory training programmes, 
Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008) could be adopted to manipulate interference 
control. Such programmes have been demonstrated to improve performance of measures of 
working memory capacity, and thus would be predicted to reduce the tendency to ruminate in 
response to low mood. However, it is of note that the extent to which such training benefits 
transfer to novel tasks is the subject of debate (see Shipstead, Redick & Engle, 2012 for 
recent review). 
More is not always better 
The pattern of correlational data regarding trait rumination suggests another intriguing 
avenue for future research. There is correlational evidence suggesting that in some 
circumstances trait rumination may be positively associated with better task performance on 
tasks that index interference control processes (specifically, the modified Stroop task, 
Altamirano et al., 2010; negative affective priming, Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 
2010; retrieval induced forgetting, Whitmer & Banich, 2010; suppression-induced forgetting, 
Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; and directed forgetting, Joormann & Tran, 2009).  
All these procedures use poorer performance (slower or less accurate) on a task as an 
index of stronger interference control. As a laboratory procedure to study interference 
control, such a technique is clearly valid. However, the authors of the studies examining the 
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association between trait rumination and performance on these tasks have equated stronger 
interference control with better interference control, and this may not always be a valid 
assumption. An alternative interpretation is that it is possible to have overly strong 
interference control at a cost to efficient task performance. For example, in the directed 
forgetting paradigm employed by Joormann and Tran (2009), high trait ruminators are just as 
good as low trait ruminators in suppressing a response when asked to do so, but they are 
better at recalling that suppressed response later on when asked to recall it.  The fact that this 
superior performance is observed in several studies for which the materials are neutral 
(Altamirano et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Banich, 2010; Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2012) rules out alternative accounts in terms of processing biases (see Koster et al., 
2011). The hypotheses that rumination sometimes leads to better interference control, and/or 
that better interference control sometimes leads to greater rumination (e.g., Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2013) are striking and currently based solely on correlational data. Experimental 
investigation of these hypotheses may be important topics for future research.  
The role of valence of task stimuli  
The role of stimulus valence in rumination-related interference control difficulties is 
complex. Although some studies suggest that the correlation between trait rumination and 
interference control deficits is specific to emotional or negatively valenced material 
(Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Demeyer et al., 2012; De Lissnyder et al., 2011; De Lissnyder, 
Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Berman et al., 2011; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann et al., 
2011; Lau et al., 2007), a substantial number of studies demonstrate that trait rumination is 
associated with impaired interference control when processing neutral material or irrespective 
of the emotionality of the material (Altamirano et al., Daches et al., 2010; Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Levens et al., 2009; Stout & Rokke, 2010; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007; von Hippel et al., 2008). Further studies are needed to 
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systematically examine the relationship between rumination, and interference resolution 
when processing positive, negative, and neutral stimuli.  
Rumination involves prolonged and repetitive focus upon and processing of negative 
material, and high trait ruminators preferentially process negative material and demonstrate 
difficulties resolving interference from negative distractors (Koster et al., 2011). Repeated 
and sustained processing of negative self-relevant material and difficulties disengaging from 
this is likely to exacerbate and prolong negative moods and dysphoric states, increasing 
vulnerability to depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Studies that directly contrast the 
potential presence of interference control deficits amongst depressed individuals in measures 
that implicate the same inhibitory subtype but contrast neutral and emotionally valenced 
materials will be a potentially useful step in clarifying the potential role of emotional material 
in the relationship between depression and interference control deficits. 
To date, the data regarding the effects of induced rumination on interference control is 
limited to neutral stimuli. An R→I account would predict that rumination-related 
impairments would be evident across neutral and emotional stimuli and attributable to 
reduced cognitive capacity. Additionally, the impact of induced rumination might be 
predicted to be strongest in the context of negative material, as depressive-related biases 
towards the processing of negative content would cause a greater pull on resource allocation.  
The predictions regarding an I→R hypothesis are less clear with regard to the role of 
stimulus valence but theorists have tended to focus on the processing of emotional material 
(e.g., Joormann, 2005). According to control theories of rumination, goal pursuit plays an 
important role in rumination (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996). If the hypothesised causal role of 
interference control in state rumination is specific to negative material then impaired 
interference control would be predicted to increase susceptibility to negative rumination 
(about lack of expected goal progress) but not positive rumination (about greater than 
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expected goal progress). In contrast, if impaired interference control for all emotional 
material plays a causal role in rumination, then increased rumination about both positive and 
negative goal discrepancies would be predicted when interference control capabilities are 
depleted or impaired. Future work systematically examining these predictions will be a 
valuable step in clarifying the role of stimulus valence in the I→R model. 
Taxonomies 
Different operationalizations of interference control have been implicated in theories 
of rumination and inhibition. A number of studies have adopted paradigms that implicate the 
resistance to interference subtype (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Hertel, 1998; Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann & Tran, 2009; Joormann et al., 2010; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Banich, 2010). This is consistent with theoretical 
accounts of this relationship (Linville, 1996; Joormann et al., 2007), to which the resistance 
to proactive interference operationalization of interference control is most relevant (e.g., 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Linville, 1996). A substantial number of additional studies 
provide further convergent evidence that rumination is related to interference control 
processes. Thus, on the basis of existing evidence, rumination appears to be most clearly 
related to the resistance to interference subtype.  
However, the evidence regarding rumination and the prepotent response inhibition 
subtype is relatively weak, with few studies having examined this operationalization with 
respect to rumination. Thus, it is not clear if the relationship between rumination and 
interference control is specific to one or more of the subtypes of interference control. There is 
a need for studies adopting multiple measures in order to address the distinct 
operationalizations of inhibition proposed by the taxonomies (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 
2004).  
Clinical Implications 
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 The different proposed accounts of the relationship between rumination and 
interference control processes have distinct implications for clinical understanding of, and 
interventions for, rumination and depression. The three accounts specifying a causal 
relationship each predict distinct approaches to reducing cognitive interference and 
rumination in depression. 
 The R→I account would suggest that the extent of cognitive impairments reported 
across episodes of depression, and also during recovery, may be related to the extent and 
severity of pathological rumination. Moreover, it implies that rumination does not occur as a 
consequence of underlying interference control deficits, suggesting that other models (a 
habitual response style, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; control theory, Watkins, 2008) may account 
for rumination. Clinically, this would suggest that targeting interference control processes 
would not be an efficacious way to reduce rumination. Moreover, it suggests that specifically 
targeting pathological rumination through extant treatments focusing on processing style 
(Watkins et al., 2007, 2011) should be beneficial in reducing the cognitive impairments that 
are reported in depression.  
 In contrast, the I→R account would imply that underlying interference control deficits 
would need to be a key target for the assessment and treatment of rumination. This account 
would predict that for interventions to have a long-term benefit in reducing rumination, they 
would need to address deficits in interference control, perhaps through cognitive training 
programmes designed to increase working memory capacity (see Shipstead et al., 2012 for 
recent review and critique of WM training approaches) or enhance inhibitory control (e.g., 
Muraven, 2010). Moreover, this account predicts that experimental assessment of 
interference control may be a good index of potential susceptibility to pathological 
rumination, to be used to identify individuals at high risk and to assess the impact of 
interventions. Moreover, this account would indicate the potential value of neurobiological 
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interventions to improve interference control, whether through psychopharmacological 
intervention or through identifying relevant neural substrates through functional MRI and 
then manipulating their activity through repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation (for 
detailed discussion of the use of TMS in depression see Loo & Mitchell, 2005).  A bi-
directional relationship would indicate the potential value of both of these approaches.  
 
Conclusions 
 The relationship between rumination and interference control is an important research 
topic with clear clinical and theoretical importance in advancing our understanding of 
depression. Research should, as a matter of urgency, move beyond correlational studies, to 
carefully designed experimental studies that have the potential to investigate the proposed 
causal mechanisms. With over twenty correlational studies but just six experimental studies 
to date, and with the experimental studies having significant limitations in terms of construct 
validity and confounding variables, there is a clear need for further experimental research in 
this area. Such limited experimental research as there is tentatively suggests that rumination 
may cause deficits in interference control; describing them as deficits of inhibitory control 
goes beyond the data. The idea that interference-control deficits cause rumination has not yet 
been the subject of experimental research. 
  
35 
 
References 
 
Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. 
Nature, 410, 366-369. 
Anderson, M. C., & Spellman, B. A., (1995). On the status of inhibitory mechanisms in 
cognition: Memory retrieval as a model case. Psychological Review, 102, 68-100. 
Andrews, P. W., & Thomson, J. A. (2009). The bright side of being blue: Depression as an 
adaptation for analyzing complex problems. Psychological Review, 116 (3), 520-564. 
Altamirano, L. J., Miyake, A., & Whitmer, A. (2010). When mental inflexibility facilitates 
executive control: Beneficial side effects of ruminative tendencies on goal 
maintenance. Psychological Science, 21(10), 1377-1382. 
Aron, A. R. (2007). The neural basis of inhibition in cognitive control. The Neuroscientist, 13 
(3), 1-15. 
Baddeley, A, Emslie, H, Kolodny, J, & Duncan, J .(1998)  Random generation and the 
executive control of working memory. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Section A, 51 (4), 819-852. 
Beevers, C. G. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to depression: A dual process model. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 25, 975-1002. 
Berman, M. G., Nee, D. E., Casement, M., Kim, H. S., Deldin, P., Kross, E., Gonzalez, R., 
Demiralp, E., Gotlib, I. H., Hamilton, P., Joormann, J., Waugh, C., & Jonides, J. 
(2011). Neural and behavioural effects of interference resolution in depression and 
rumination. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioural Neuroscience, 11, 85-96. 
Bernblum, R., & Mor, N. (2010). Rumination and emotion-related biases in refreshing 
information. Emotion, 10 (3), 423 – 432. 
36 
 
Bissett, P. G., Nee, D. E., & Jonides, J. (2009). Dissociating interference control processes 
between memory and response. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 35 (5), 1306-1316. 
Brown, R. G., Soliveri, P., & Jahanshahi, M. (1998). Exectutive processes in Parkinson's 
disease. Random number generation and response suppression. Neuropsychologia, 36, 
1355-1362. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control theory: A useful  conceptual framework for 
 personality-social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92 (1), 
 111-135. 
Channon, S. (1996). Executive function in depression: The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 30, 107-114. 
Cheun Yee Lo, B., Lau, S., Cheung, S., & Allen, N. B. (2012). The impact of rumination on 
internal switching. Cognition and Emotion, 26 (2), 209-223. 
Clore, G. L. & Gasper,  K.  (2000).  Feeling is Believing: Some Affective Influences on 
Belief.  In N. H. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead, &  S. Bem (Eds.)  Emotions and beliefs: 
How do emotions influence beliefs? (pp. 10-44). Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press. 
Curci, A., Lanciano, T., Soleti, E., & Rime, B. (2013). Negative emotional experiences 
arouse rumination and affect working memory capacity. Emotion, 13 (5), 867-80. 
Daches, S., Mor, N., Winquist, J., & Gilboa-Schechtman, E. (2010). Brooding and attentional 
control in processing self-encoded information: Evidence from a modified Garner 
task. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (5), 876-885. 
Davis, R. N., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). Cognitive inflexibility amongst ruminators and 
nonruminators. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24 (6), 699-711. 
37 
 
Demeyer, I., De Lissnyder, E., Koster, E. H. W., & De Raedt, R. (2012). Rumination 
mediates the relationship between impaired cognitive control for emotional 
information and depressive symptoms: A prospective study in remitted depressed 
adults. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 50, 292-297. 
De Lissnyder, E., Derakshan, N., De Raedt, R., & Koster, E. H. W. (2011). Depressive 
symptoms and cognitive control in a mixed antisaccade task: Specific effects of 
rumination. Cognition and Emotion, 25 (5), 886-897. 
De Lissnyder, E., Koster, E. H. W., Derakshan, N., & De Raedt, R. (2010). The association 
between depressive symptoms and executive control impairments in response to 
emotional and non-emotional information. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (2), 264 – 280. 
De Lissnyder, E., Koster, E. H., Everaert, J., Schacht, R., Van den Abeele, D., & De Raedt, 
R. (2012). Internal cognitive control in clinical depression: general but no emotion-
specific impairments. Psychiatry Research, 199 (2), 124-30. 
De Lissnyder, E., Koster, E. H. W., Goubert, L., Onraedt, T., Vanderhasselt, M. & De Raedt, 
R. (2012). Cognitive control moderates the association between stress and rumination. 
Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 519-525. 
De Lissnyder, E. Koster, E. H. W., & De Raedt, R. (2012). Emotional interference in working 
memory is related to rumination. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 36 (4). 348-357. 
De Raedt, R., & Koster, E. H. W. (2010). Understanding vulnerability to depression from a 
cognitive neuroscience perspective: A reappraisal of attentional factors and a new 
conceptual framework. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, 10 (1), 
50-70. 
Easdon, C. M., & Vogel-Sprott, M. (2000). Alcohol and behavioural control: Impaired 
response inhibition and flexibility in social drinkers. Experimental and clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 8 (3), 387-394. 
38 
 
Ellenbogen, M., Schwartzman, A.E., Stewart, J., & Walker, D. (2002). Stress and selective 
attention: The interplay of mood, cortisol levels, and emotional information 
processing. Psychophysiology, 39, 723-732. 
Ellis, H. C. & Ashbrook, P. W. (1988). Resource allocation model of the effects of depressed 
mood states on memory.  In K. Fielder (Ed.), Affect, Cognition, and Social Behaviour 
(pp. 25-43). Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Fillmore, M. T., Vogel-Sprott, M., & Gavrilescu, D. (1999). Alcohol effects on intentional 
behaviour: Dissociating controlled and automatic influences. Experimental and 
Clinical Psychopharmacology, 7 (4), 372-378. 
Finnigan, F., Schulze, D., & Smallwood, J. (2007). Alcohol and the wandering mind: A new 
direction in the study of alcohol on attentional lapses. International Journal on 
Disability and Human Development, 6 (2), 189-199. 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference 
control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133 (1), 101-135. 
Frings, C., Wentura, D., & Holtz, M. (2007). Dysphorics cannot ignore unpleasant 
information. Cognition & Emotion, 21 (7), 1525-1534. 
Goeleven, E., De Raedt, R., Baert, S., & Koster, E. H. W. (2006). Deficient inhibition of 
emotional information in depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 93, 149-157. 
Gotlib, I., H. & Joormann, J. (2010). Cognition and depression: Current status and future 
directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 285 – 312.  
Grant, D. A., & Berg, E. (1948). A behavioral analysis of degree of reinforcement and ease of 
shifting to new responses in a Weigl-type card-sorting problem. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 38 (4), 404-411. 
39 
 
Greve, K. W., Williams, M. C., Haas, W. G., Littell, R. R., & Rinoso, C. (1996). The role of 
attention in Wisconsin card sorting test performance. Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 11 (3), 215-222. 
Gwiazda, J., Ong, E., Held, R., & Thorn, F. (2000). Vision: Myopia and ambient night-time 
lighting. Nature, 404, 144. 
Hartlage, S., Alloy, L. B., Vazquez, C., & Dykman, B. (1993). Automatic and effortful 
processing in depression. Psychological Bulletin, 113 (2), 247-278. 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 356-389. 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1988). Working memory, comprehension, and aging: A review 
and new view. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation 
(Vol. 22, pp. 193-225). New York: Academic Press. 
Hertel, P. T. (1997). On the contributions of deficient cognitive control to memory 
impairments in depression. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 569-584. 
Hertel, P. T. (1998). Relation between rumination and impaired memory in dysphoric moods. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 166-172. 
Hertel, P. T. (2004). Memory for emotional and nonemotional events in depression: A 
question of habit? In D. Reisberg & P. Hertel (Eds.) Memory and Emotion (pp. 186-
216). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hertel, P. T., & Gerstle, M. (2003). Depressive deficits in forgetting. Psychological Science, 
14, 573-578. 
Hertel, P. T., & Rude, S. S. (1991). Depressive deficits in memory.Focusing attention 
improves subsequent recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 120, 301-
309. 
40 
 
Hester, R., & Garavan, H. (2005). Working memory and executive function: The influence of 
content and load on the control of attention. Memory and Cognition, 33 (2), 221-233. 
Houghton, G., & Tipper, S. P. (1984). A model of inhibitory mechanisms in selective 
attention. In Dagenbach, Dale (Ed); Carr, Thomas H. (Ed), (1994). Inhibitory 
processes in attention, memory, and language. , (pp. 53-112). San Diego, CA, US: 
Academic Press, xiv, 461 pp. 
Izard, C. E., Dougherty, F. E., Bloxom, B. M., & Kotsch, N. E. (1974). The Differential 
Emotion Scale: A method of measuring the meaning of subjective experience of 
discrete emotions. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, Department of Psychology. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language 30 (5), 513-541 
Jacoby, L. L. (1996). Dissociating automatic and consciously controlled effects of study/test 
compatibility. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 32-52. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1998). Invariance in automatic influences of memory: Toward a users guide 
for the process-dissociation procedure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24 (1), 3-26. 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving fluid 
intelligence with training on working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 105 (19), 6829-6833. 
Jones, N. P., Siegle, G. J., Muelly, E. R., Haggerty, A., & Ghinassi, F. (2010). Cognitive, 
Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, 10 (1), 129-140. 
Joormann, J. (2005). Inhibition, rumination, and mood regulation in depression. In R.W. 
Engle, G. Sedak, U von Hecker, & D.N. McIntosh (Eds.), Cognitive Limitations in 
Aging and Psychopathology: Attention, Working Memory, and Executive Functions, 
pp. 275-312. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
41 
 
Joormann, J. (2006). The relation of rumination and inhibition: Evidence from a negative 
priming task. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30, 149-160. 
Joormann, J. (2010). Cognitive inhibition and emotion regulation in depression. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 19 (3), 161-166. 
Joormann, J., & D’Avanzato, C. (2010). Emotion regulation in depression: Examining the 
role of cognitive processes. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (6), 913-939. 
Joormann, J., Levens, S. M., & Gotlib, I. H. (2011). Sticky thoughts: Depression and 
rumination are associated with difficulties manipulating emotional material in 
working memory. Psychological Science, 22 (8), 979-983. 
Joormann, J., Nee, D. E., Berman, M. G., Jonides, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Interference 
resolution in major depression. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, 
10 (1), 21-33.  
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H., (2008). Updating the contents of working memory in 
depression: Interference from irrelevant negative material. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 117, 182-192. 
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Emotion regulation in major depression: Relation to 
cognitive inhibition. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (2), 281-298. 
Joormann, J., & Tran, T. B. (2009).Rumination and intentional forgetting of emotional 
material. Cognition and Emotion, 23 (6), 1233-1246. 
Joormann, J., Yoon, K. L., & Zetsche, U. (2007). Cognitive inhibition in depression. Applied 
and Preventive Psychology, 12, 128-139. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working memory capacity and the control of attention: 
The contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to Stroop 
interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132 (1), 47-70. 
42 
 
Kofta,, M., & Sedak, G. (1998). Uncontrollability as a source of cognitive exhaustion: 
Implications for helplessness and depression. In M. Kofta, G. Weary, & G. Sedak 
(Eds.), Personal control in action: Cognitive and motivational mechanisms (pp. 391-
418). New York: Plenum. 
Koster, E. H. W., De Lissnyder, E., Derakshan, N., & De Raedt, R. (2011). Understanding 
depressive rumination from a cognitive science perspective: The impaired 
disengagement hypothesis. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 138-145. 
Koster, E.H.W., & De Raedt, R., Leyman, L., & De Lissnyder, E. (2010). Mood-congruent 
attention and memory bias in dysphoria: Exploring the coherence among information 
processing biases. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 219-225. 
Krames, L., & MacDonald, M. R. (1985). Distraction and depressive cognitions. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 9 (5), 561-573. 
Krompinger, J. W., & Simons, R. F. (2011). Cognitive inefficiency in depressive 
undergraduates: Stroop processing and ERPs. Biological Psychology, 86 (3), 239-46. 
Lau, M. A., Christensen, B. K., Hawley, L. L., Gemar, M. S., & Segal, Z. V. (2007). 
Inhibitory deficits for negative information in persons with major depressive disorder. 
Psychological Medicine, 37, 1249-1259.  
Lavender, A., & Watkins, E. (2004). Rumination and future thinking in depression. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43, 129-142. 
Lee Pe, M., Raes, F., Koval, P., Brans, K., Verduyn, P., & Kuppens, P. (2013). Interference 
resolution moderates the impact of rumination and reappraisal on affective 
experiences in daily life. Cognition and Emotion, 27 (3), 492-501. 
Lee Pe, M., Vandekerckhove, J., & Kuppens, P. (2013). A diffusion model account of the 
relationship between the emotional flanker task, rumination, and depression. Emotion, 
13 (4), 739-747. 
43 
 
Levens, S. M., Muhtadie, L., & Gotlib, I. H. (2009). Rumination and impaired resource 
allocation in depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118 (4), 757-766. 
Linville, P. (1996). Attention inhibition: Does it underlie ruminative thought? In R. S. Wyer 
(Ed.), Ruminative thoughts: Advances in social cognition (Vol. IX, pp. 121-133). 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Logan, G. D., Cowan, W. B., & Davis, K. A. (1984). On the ability to inhibit simple choice 
and reaction time responses: A model and a method. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10 (2), 276-291. 
Loo, C. K., & Mitchell, P. B. (2005). A review of the efficacy of transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) treatment for depression, and current and future strategies to 
optimize efficacy.  Journal of Affective Disorders, 88, 255-267. 
Lyubomirsky, S., Caldwell, N. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Effects of ruminative and 
distracting responses to depressed mood on retrieval of autobiographical memories. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 (1), 166-177. 
Lyubomirsky, S., Kasri, F., & Zehm, K. (2003). Dysphoric rumination impairs concentration 
on academic tasks. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27 (3), 309-330. 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1995). Effects of self-focused rumination on 
negative thinking and interpersonal problem solving. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 69 (1), 176-190. 
MacLeod, C. M. (1998). Directed forgetting. In J. M. Golding & C. M. MacLeod (Eds.), 
Intentional forgetting: Interdisciplinary approaches (pp. 1-57). Mahwah, N. J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
MacLeod, C. M. (2005). The Stroop task in cognitive research. In A. Wenzel & D. C. Rubin 
(Eds.), Cognitive methods and their application to clinical research (pp. 17-40). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
44 
 
MacLeod, C. M. (2007). The concept of inhibition in cognition. In D. S. Gorfein and C. M. 
MacLeod (Eds.), Inhibition in cognition (pp. 3-23). Washington D.C.: American 
Psychological Association. 
MacLeod, C. M., Dodd, M. D., Sheard, E. D., Wilson, D. E., & Bibi, U. (2003). In opposition 
to inhibition. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol. 
43, pp. 163-214). San Diego, C. A.: Academic Press.  
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1996). Some ruminative thoughts. In R. S. Wyer (Ed.), 
Ruminative thoughts: Advances in social cognition (Vol. IX, pp. 1-47). Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
May, C. P., & Hasher, L. (1998). Synchrony effects in inhibitory control over thought and 
action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24 
(2), 363-379. 
May, C. P., Kane, M. J., & Hasher, L. (1995). Determinants of negative priming. 
Psychological Bulletin, 18 (1), 35-54. 
Mayr, S., & Buchner, A. (2007). Negative priming as a memory phenomenon A review of 20 
years of negative priming research. Zeitschrift fur Pyschologie, 215 (1), 35-51. 
Meiran, N., Diamond, G. M., Toder, D., & Nemets, B. (2011). Cognitive rigidity in unipolar 
depression and obsessive compulsive disorder: Examination of task switching, Stroop, 
working memory updating and post-conflict adaptation. Psychiatry Research, 185, 
149-156. 
Miyake, A.,  Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to 
complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 
49-100. 
45 
 
Monsell, S., Taylor, T. J., & Murphy, K. (2001). Naming the color of a word: is it responses 
or task sets that compete? Memory and Cognition, 29 (1), 137-151. 
Morrow, J. & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1990). Effects of responses to depression on the 
remediation of depressive affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58 
(3), 519-527. 
Muraven, M. (2010). Building self-control strength: Practising self-control leads to improved 
self-control performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46 (2), 465-
468. 
Nee, D. E., & Jonides, J. (2008). Dissociable interference-control processes in perception and 
memory. Psychological Science, 19, 490-500. 
Niell, W. T. & Mathis, K. M. (1998). Transfer-inappropriate processing: Negative priming 
and related phenomena. In D. L. Medin (Ed.), The psychology of learning and 
motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol 38). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology: Views 
from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126 (2), 220-246. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of 
depressive episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100 (4), 569-582. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed 
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109 (3), 504-511. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The 1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61 (1), 115-121. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1993). Effects of rumination and distraction on naturally 
occurring depressed mood. Cognition and Emotion, 7 (6), 561-570. 
46 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B. E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3 (5), 400-424. 
Oberauer, K. (2001). Removing irrelevant information from working memory: A cognitive 
aging study with the modified Sternberg task. Journal of Experimental Psychology-
Learning Memory and Cognition, 27(4), 948-957. 
Owens, M., & Derakshan, N. (2013). The effects of dysphoria and rumination on cognitive 
flexibility and task selection. Acta Psychologica, 142, 323-331. 
Philippot, P., & Brutoux, F. (2008). Induced rumination dampens executive processes in 
dysphoric young adults. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
39, 219-227. 
Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (1987). Self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive 
self-focusing style: A self-awareness theory of reactive depression. Psychological 
Bulletin, 102 (1), 122-138. 
Quinn, G. E., Shin, C. H., Maguire, M. G., & Stone, R. A. (1999). Myopia and ambient 
lighting at night. Nature, 399, 113-114. 
Ray, R. D., Ochsner, K. N., Cooper, J. C., Robertson, E. R., Gabrieli, J. D. E., & Gross, J. J. 
(2005). Individual differences in trait rumination and the neural systems supporting 
cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 5 (2), 156-
168. 
Ratcliff, R. (2006). Modeling response signal and response time data. Cognitive Psychology, 
53 (3), 195-237. 
Roberts, H., Watkins, E. R., & Wills, A. J. (2013). Cueing an unresolved personal goal causes 
persistent ruminative self-focus: An experimental evaluation of control theories of 
rumination. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 44, 449-455. 
47 
 
Rusting, C. L., & DeHart, T. (2000). Retrieving positive memories to regulate negative 
mood: Consequences for mood-congruent memory. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78 (4), 737-752. 
Shipstead, Z., Redick, T. S., & Engle, R. W. (2012). Is working memory training effective? 
Psychological Bulletin, 138 (4), 628-654.  
Smallwood, J., Obsonsawin, M., Baracaia, S. F., Reid, H., O’Connor, R., & Heim, D. (2002). 
The relationship between rumination, dysphoria, and self-referent thinking: Some 
preliminary findings. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 22 (4), 317-342. 
Smallwood, J., Fitzgerald, A., Miles, L. & Phillips, LH. (2009). Shifting Moods, Wandering 
Minds: Negative Moods Lead the Mind to Wander. Emotion, 9 (2), 271-276. 
Snyder, H. R. (2013). Major Depressive Disorder is associated with broad impairments on 
neuropsychological measures of executive function: A meta-analysis and review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 139 (1), 81-132. 
Stout, D. M., & Rokke, P.D. (2010). Components of working memory predict symptoms of 
distress. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (8), 1293-1303. 
Strauss, E., Sherman, E. M. S., & Spreen, O. (2006). A compendium of neuropsychological 
tests: Administration, norms, and commentary. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Tipper, S. P. (2001). Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review and 
integration of conflicting views. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
54A (2), 321-343. 
Towse, J. N., & Valentine, J. D. (1997). Random generation of numbers: A search for 
underlying processes. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9 (4), 381-400. 
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A 
psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27 (3), 247-259. 
48 
 
Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal 
of Memory and Language, 28, 127-154. 
Unsworth, N., & Engle, R.W.  (2005).  Working memory capacity and fluid abilities:  
Examining the correlation between operation span and raven.  Intelligence, 33, 67-81. 
Vanderhasselt, M., Kuhn, S., & De Raedt, R. (2011). Healthy brooders employ more 
attentional resources when disengaging from the negative: an event-related fMRI 
study. Cognitive Affective and Behavioural Neuroscience, 11, 207-216. 
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B. & Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switching: Interplay of 
reconfiguration and interference control. Psychological Bulletin, 136 (4), 601-626. 
Von Hecker, U., & Sedak, G. (1999). Uncontrollability, depression, and the construction of 
mental models. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77 (4), 833-850. 
Von Hippel, W., Vasey, M. W., Gonda, T., & Stern, T. (2008). Executive function deficits, 
rumination and late-onset depressive symptoms in older adults. Cognitive Therapy & 
Research, 32 (4), 474-487. 
Watkins, E.R. (2004). Adaptive and Maladaptive Ruminative self-focus during Emotional 
Processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 1037-1052. 
Watkins, E. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychological 
Bulletin, 134 (2), 163-206. 
Watkins, E. R. (2010). Level of construal, mind wandering, and repetitive thought: Reply to 
McVay and Kane (2010). Psychological Bulletin, 136 (2), 198-201. 
Watkins, E., & Brown, R. G. (2002). Rumination and executive function in depression: An 
experimental study. Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 72, 400-402.  
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral memory in depression: 
Effects of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110 (2), 
353-357. 
49 
 
Watkins, E., & Moulds, M. L. (2005). Distinct modes of ruminative self-focus: Impact of 
abstract versus concrete problem solving in depression. Emotion, 5, 319-328. 
Watkins, E.R., Mullan, E., Wingrove, J., Rimes, K., Steiner, H., Bathurst, N., Eastman, R., 
Scott, J. (2011). Rumination-focused cognitive-behavioural therapy for residual 
depression: phase II randomised controlled trial. British Journal of Psychiatry, 
199(4), 317-322. 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82 (1), 1-8. 
Watkins, E., Scott, J., Wingrove, J., Rimes, K,, Bathurst, N,, Steiner, H., Kennell-Webb, S., 
Moulds, M., & Malliaris, Y. (2007). Rumination-focused cognitive behaviour therapy 
for residual depression: a case series. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(9), 2144-
2154. 
Whitmer, A. J., & Banich, M. T. (2007). Inhibition versus switching deficits in different 
forms of rumination. Psychological Science, 18 (6), 546-553. 
Whitmer, A. J., & Banich, M. T. (2010). Trait rumination and inhibitory deficits in long-term 
memory. Cognition and Emotion, 24 (1), 168-179. 
Whitmer, A. J., & Banich, M. T. (2012). Repetitive thought and reversal learning deficits. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 36 (6), 714-721. 
Whitmer, A., & Gotlib, I. H. (2012). Switching and backward inhibition in major depressive 
disorder: The role of rumination. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 121 (3), 570-8. 
Whitmer, A., & Gotlib, I. H. (2013). An attentional scope model of rumination. 
Psychological Bulletin, 139 (5), 1036-1061. 
Wong, A. C. M., & Moulds, M. L. (2008). Depressive rumination and directed forgetting: An 
examination of encoding style. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32 (1), 1-10. 
50 
 
Zetsche, U., D’Avanzato, C., & Joormann, J. (2012). Depression and rumination: Relation to 
components of inhibition. Cognition and Emotion, 26 (4), 758-767. 
Zetsche, U., & Joormann, J. (2011). Components of interference control predict depressive 
symptoms and rumination cross-sectionally and at six months follow-up. Journal of 
Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42, 65-73. 
  
51 
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